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'ATTICA, JURY POOLS AND THE INTENT REQUIREMENTOF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
In September of 1971, inmates at New York's Attica Prison staged
an uprising in which 43 prisoners and hostages were killed and numerous others. injured.- As a result, 61 Attica prisoners were indicted
2
for various offenses all of which related to the five day incident.
In July of 1973, members of the Attica Brothers Legal Defense,
an organization established in order to provide counsel for the various
defendants, began a study of the jury selection system of Erie County,
New York, where the "Attica Brothers" are to stand trial. The study
showed that Erie County is one of only two highly populated jurisdictions in the United States to use a permanent pool system. 3 In this
type of system, those persons selected to be potential jurors remain in
the pool for life unless they should subsequently become exempt or
disqualified. 4 In the case of the Erie County pool, the statistical data
revealed that blacks, women, poor people, certain occupational groups,
and people between the ages of 21 and 29 were significantly underrepresented in relation to the demographic composition of the county.5
In addition, the study found that there were "defects and illegal ac-7
tions in the selection process" which caused these disparities to arise.
1.

THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NEw YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON

ArICA xi (1972).

2. New York Times, June 10, 1974, at 61, col. 1.
3. Affidavit of David Kairy5 for Defendants at 2, People v. Attica Brothers,
79 Misc. 2d 492, 359 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1974). Chicago, Illinois, is apparently the only
other large jurisdiction to use this system. Id.,
4. Affidavit of Beth Marie Bonora for Defendants at 5, People v. Attica Brothers,
79 Misc. 2d 492, 359 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1974).
5. The defendants alleged that blacks were underrepresented by 34.3 percent as
compared with the population, women by 68.3 percent, and people between the ages
of 21 and 29 by 83.6 percent. Underrepresentation of the poor was alleged to be
"significant." Affidavit of Neal Bush for Defendants at 5, People v. Attica Brothers,
79 Misc. 2d 492, 359 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1974).
6. Id. at 2.
7. Among the many irregularities alleged by the defendants were:
1) The initial selection of names from voter registration lists was improperly
conducted since clerks could select any names they wished and were not
bound by any specific method of choosing names.
2) The Jury Commissioner could disqualify any potential juror because he
found this person to be "undesirable." This category is not defined in any
statute or court rule.
3) A number of "cards" of potential jury pool members were found to have
indications of their race written on them. The defendants alleged that all of
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A motion was made in March of 1974 in the Erie County division of the Supreme Court of New York to strike the county's permanent pool system as being violative of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.8 The
court found that there had been unconstitutional exclusion of women
and students prior to January 1, 1974, but that this discrimination had
ceased as of that date. The court found no improper underrepresentation of occupational groups, young people or the poor. For these reasons, the entire jury pool system was not stricken as had been demanded by the defendants. Instead, the court ordered only the names
of those people who had been selected before January 1, 1974 to be
eliminated from the pool since they were chosen at a time when the
selection procedure was discriminatory. People v. Attica Brothers, 79
Misc. 2d 492, 359 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1974) .9
The basic rationale for this decision was that statistical disparity
between a group's proportional representation in the community and
its corresponding representation in the jury pool does not, in itself,
constitute a violation of the equal protection clause. Rather, the
court found the determining factor to be whether there is evidence
of "intentional and systematic discrimination."' 0 In this instance, the
court was satisfied that purposeful exclusion of eligible persons had
occurred only with respect to students and women prior to January
1, 1974.
I.

THE BURDEN

SHIFTING RULE

The opinion of the court was accurate in its statement of the law
in this area. The Supreme Court of the United States has on several
occasions held that in jury discrimination cases, only purposeful
underrepresentation of a cognizable segment of society constitutes a
these "cards" belonged to black persons who had been disqualified from
service.
Id. at 2-5.
8. The defendants alleged violations of the fifth and sixth amendments as well
as the fourteenth. The court, however, addressed itself solely to the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment in deciding the case. The possibility of sixth
amendment challenges to state jury systems is discussed in Note, The Constitutionality
of Excluding Young People From Jury Service, 29 WAsHz & LEE L. RIv. 131 (1972).
9. Hereinafter cited as instant case.
10. Instant case at 494, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 702.

JURY POOLS

violation of the equal protection clause..' However, the opinion overlooks a number of Supreme Court decisions which indicate that under
certain circumstances, significant statistical disparity, while not sufficient to render a jury selection system per se unconstitutional, is
enough to establish a rebuttable prima facie case of discrimination. 12
The result is a shift in the burden of proof; the prosecution must
justify the jury selection system by proving that there has been no
violation of the Constitution. 3
The use of statistical data to shift the burden of proof in jury
discrimination cases originated in 1934 when the Supreme Court decided Norris v. Alabama.14 However, the Norris case and its progeny 5
permitted the establishment of a prima facie case of discrimination
only where there was total exclusion of a distinct group.'6 The application of the burden shifting principle to cases where there is
underrepresentation but not total exclusion is a more recent de17
velopment.
Two criteria must be satisfied before the burden of proof will
be shifted to the government in this latter type of case. Initially, the
defendant must demonstrate that the jury system in question afforded
jury officials some "opportunity for discrimination."' 8t Apparently,
this "opportunity" must be shown in order to convince the court
that the possibility of purposeful discrimination existed in a given
situation.
Secondly, the defendant must demonstrate that a cognizable
group was significantly underrepresented at a stage of the jury selection process where this "opportunity for discrimination" existed. 19 The
11. The history of this proposition is discussed in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202, 203-04 (1965).
12. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S.
346 (1970); Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24 (1967); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545
(1967); Kuhn, Jury Discrimination, 41 So. CAL. L. Rav. 235, 251-57 (1968).
13. Kuhn, supra note 12, at 251.
14. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
15. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400

(1942).
16. Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Dis-

crimination Cases, 80 HAv. L. REv. 338, 341-49 (1966).

17. Older underrepresentation cases in which the Supreme Court did not shift
the burden of proof include: Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Cassell v.
Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945).
18. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552 (1967).
19. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 629-32 (1972); Whitus v. Georgia,
385 U.S. 545, 549-52 (1967).
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Supreme Court has never adequately defined this standard. Nowhere
has the Court indicated, even in the most approximate 0f terms, the
degree of disparity which is necessary to establish a prima facie case
of discrimination. 20 This ambiguity is likely to result in inconsistent
decisions in future jury discrimination cases.
A. State Courts and the Burden Shifting Rule
Notwithstanding this difficulty, the courts of most states have
applied the burden shifting rule at some time and in some form. 2
This has been manifested in several recent decisions. In Williams v.
State,2 2 the Arkansas Supreme Court found a prima facie case of discrimination where blacks were underrepresented on the jury panel
from which the jury that convicted the defendant was selected. The
court stated that both statistical disparity and "a source where separate
race is indicated" ("opportunity for discrimination") must exist if
the burden of proof is to be shifted.23 A different standard was
promulgated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Wilson v. State.2
In that case, the court required the defendant to prove that there
had been "disproportionate representation in the array 'over a period
of time'" in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 2 5
"Opportunity for discrimination" was not considered. The Georgia
courts have been willing to shift the burden of proof only where the
defendant has been able to show both "opportunity" and "spectacular" underrepresentation. 26 The Massachusetts courts have found "evidence of discriminatory exclusion" only where "drastic" disproportion has been proven.2 7
The lack of uniformity which has plagued the various state courts
in applying the burden shifting principle demonstrates the need for
a clearer statement of its requirements. However, the fact that clarification is appropriate does not justify the failure of the court which
decided the instant case to give credence to this emerging evidentiary
20. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 630 (1972).

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

E.g., Jackson v. State, 293 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1974).
254 Ark. 799, 496 S.W.2d 395 (1973).
Id. at 801, 496 S.W.2d at 397.
59 Wis. 2d 269, 208 N.W.2d 134 (1973).
Id. at 283, 208 N.W.2d at 142.
Pass v. Caldwell, 200 S.E.2d 720, 721 (1973).
E.g., Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 300 N.E.2d 192, 197 (Mass. 1973).
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rule. The" court relied heavily on the case of People v. Chestnut,28 a
leading decision on jury discrimination by the New York Court of
Appeals in which that court did not apply the burden shifting rule.
However, Chestnut is distinguishable because in that case only statistical disparity was alleged by the defendants. 29 In the instant case,
the defendants alleged, in addition to the disparity, that the jury
selection system of Erie County was not a neutral one and that it
provided jury officials with an "opportunity for discrimination."
Therefore, despite the fact that the burden shifting rule was not
applied in the Chestnut case, it should have been applied in People
v. Attica Brothers.
B. StatisticalMethods and the Burden Shifting Rule
It is difficult to predict whether a prima fade case of discrimination would have been established had the burden shifting principle
been applied in the present case. Initially, it is questionable whether
the court would have found sufficient "opportunity for discrimination" to satisfy the requirement of the rule. 30 Moreover, because the
mathematical standard which has been used by the Supreme Court
is not clearly defined, it is not certain that the disparity demonstrated
by the defendants would have been adequate to shift the burden.
Nevertheless, the failure of the Attica court to utilize the principle is
significant because it demonstrates the reluctance of courts to accept
28. 26 N.Y.2d 481, 260 N.E.2d 501, 311 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1970).
29. Id. at 289, 260 N.E.2d at 50, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
30. It is evident that there was "opportunity for discrimination" with respect to
young people in this case. All potential jury pool members were required to fill out a
questionnaire and return it to the office of the Jury Commissioner. Among the questions asked in the questionnaire was the date of birth of the potential juror. Instant
case at 495, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 703. Therefore, the opportunity was present for the
Commissioner, in exercising his discretion, to discriminate against young people.
With respect to racial categories, it is less clear whether the jury officials were
aware of the status of potential jurors. The court rejected evidence that the "cards"
of certain black people had indications of their race written on them because it was
found that these cards dated back to 1954 and were not of a significant number. The
opinion indicates that had the court applied the burden shifting principle, "opportunity for discrimination" probably would not have been found with respect to racial
groups. Id. at 497, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 705. The defendants alleged that the opportunity
for racial discrimination existed merely because clerks in the Juky Commissioner's office
could select any names they wished from voter registration lists in the initial selection
process. Affidavit of Neal Bush, supra note 5, at 2. However, unless there was some
manner in which these clerks could determine which names were those of black people,
it is difficult to understand how this discretion provided them with an "opportunity
for discrimination."
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statistical data and probability theory as an indication of constitutional violation. 31
The rationale behind the burden shifting principle is that it is
highly improbable that significant underrepresentation of a cognizable
group, in an otherwise neutral jury system, will come about accidentally. Therefore, when there is a large disparity, and when it can
be shown that there was some "opportunity for discrimination"
courts permit the inference that the inadequate representation has
been intentionally induced.3 2 The acceptance of this rule requires
recognition of the validity of statistical methods as useful implements
in determining whether a result was brought about purposefully. The
court in the Attica case apparently was not receptive to the application of these methods in cases of this nature.
The studies of the Erie County jury selection system revealed
that the probability is infinitesimal that the underrepresentation which
existed resulted from mere chance. 83 Yet, the court virtually ignored
these statistics and relied entirely on testimony concerning the matter
of intent to discriminate. 3 This attitude toward statistical methods
has little place in modem law. The task of proving discriminatory
purpose is a difficult one, and courts are imposing an undue hardship on defendants by rejecting statistical evidence in this area. Today's statistical methods are sophisticated enough to warrant more
consideration than was afforded by the court in the Attica decision.25
31. See Kuhn, supra note 12, at 253-57.
32. Id. at 251-52; Finkelstein, supra note 16, at 350.
33. The probability that blacks were accidentally underrepresented in Erie County
was calculated to be "less than one in a million." Affidavit of Jack Kiefer made on
March 25, 1974 for Defendants at 2-3, instant case. The probability that people between the ages of 21 and 29 were underrepresented by mere chance was determined
to be 1 chance in 10' 55 (one followed by fifty-five zeroes). Affidavit of Jack Kiefer
made on March 22, 1974 for Defendants at 4-5, instant case. With respect to women,
the probability of the disparity having occurred by chance is 1 in 10140. Id. at 2-3.
34. The court found violations of the fourteenth amendment in the jury pool as
it was constituted prior to January 1, 1974 based solely on the testimony of officials
of the Erie County jury selection system. The Deputy Commissioner testified that
there had been intentional exclusion of students due to the likelihood that jury
service would present hardships to them. Several clerks testified that they purposely
had selected fewer women from the source lists. There was disagreement among the
witnesses as to whether the latter practice was an official policy or merely an "understood" practice. Instant case at 495, 498, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 704, 706.
35. The use of statistical material has been employed often in the field of jury
discrimination. See, e.g., Beiser, Are Juries Representative?, 57 JUDICATURE 194 (1973);
Finkelstein, supra note 16; Kairys, Juror Selection, 10 Am. Cwns. L. Rav. 771 (1972);
Mills, A Statistical Profile of Jurors in a United States District Court, 1969 LAW a
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II.

THE INTENT REQUIREMENT

The burden shifting rule is a progressive principle in that, to
some extent, it assists defendants with the difficult burden of proving
that there has been an intentional infringement of his rights. However, the question still remains as to why any evidence of intent to
discriminate is necessary in jury selection cases. Why is not a finding
that a jury pool is unrepresentative of the community sufficient to
constitute a violation of the equal protection clause regardless of
whether a discrminatory purpose can be ascertained?
The above question is especially intriguing when one considers
the language used by the Supreme Court throughout the history of
jury discrimination cases. Since its decision in Strauder v. West
Virginia36 in 1880, the Court has steadfastly adhered to the tenet that
no jury system will be found unconstitutional unless intent to discriminate is shown to be present. Yet, in several instances, the language of the Court has implied that in no case is an unrepresentative
jury system proper.
One need only review Justice Stone's majority opinion in
Strauder, where for the first time a state statute prohibiting the
participation of blacks on state juries was declared violative of the
equal protection clause, to find words to this effect. The opinion
states: "The very idea of a jury is a body of men composed of the
peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned
to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons
having the same legal status in society as that which he holds . . . 7
It is difficult to determine how we can justify the absence of the type
of jury or jury system described above by the simple assertion that
the deprivation was unintentional.
The notion that a jury must be representative dates back to
Tudor England.38 In Strauder, Justice Stone cited Blackstone's Commentaries as authority for the proposition that a jury must be composed of the defendant's "peers." 39 In Supreme Court decisions since
Soc. ORDER 329; Zeisel, Dr. Spock and the Case of the Vanishing Women Jurors,
37 U. CHi. L. REV. 1 (1969).

36. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
37. Id. at 308.
38. Note, The Congress, the Court and Jury Selection, 52 VA. L. REv. *1069,

11)06 & n.203 (1966).
39. 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1879).
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Strauder, it has become apparent that the standard promulgated in
Tudor England has become an essential element in the letter, if not
the spirit, of the law of the United States.
A. "The Cross Section Rule"
In Smith v. Texas" the Supreme Court found a prima facie case
of racial discrimination by jury officials, and after examining the
evidence, reversed the conviction of the defendant for rape. Justice
Black, writing for the majority, stated that, "[i]t is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice
that the jury be a body truly representative of the community."4' 1
This language has evolved into what is known as the "cross section
rule." This principle, as stated in Glasser v. United States, 42 stands
for the proposition that only an impartial jury, chosen from a fair
cross section of the community, suffices in criminal cases. 43 This rule
was used by the Supreme Court to overturn a jury conviction in
Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.44 in which the majority applied the
"cross section rule" to the early stages of jury selection where lists
of
potential jurors are composed.
With respect to jury pools, the "cross section rule" has two possible applications. Initially, the doctrine would safeguard the selection of people from the community at large to compose the body of
the pool. 45 Secondly, the rule, if logically extended, would apply to
the selection of individual jury panels from the pool itself. If the
principle is to be pertinent in this latter situation, it would dictate
that the jury pool be a representative body from which ,jury panels
could be fairly selected. In this regard, what possible relevance could
the intent factor have? Do not all situations where the jury pool is
significantly unlike the population violate the "cross section rule"?
The possibility of reconciling the Glasser rule-which demands that
jury pools be representative regardless of whether there has been
purposeful discrimination-with the intent requirement-which is
40. 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
41. Id. at 130.
42. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
43. See Note, supra note 8, at 135.
44. 228 U.S. 217 (1946).
45. The most common source of names from which jury pools are selected is the
voter registration list. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1863(2), 1869 (1970).
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entirely concerned with whether any underrepresentation has been
deliberately induced-is a slight one at best.
It has been argued that the "cross section rule" is only applicable
to the federal courts because the Supreme Court decided Glasser and
Thie46 under the auspices of its supervisory powers over the federal
court system.47 However, Smith v. Texas is evidence that, at least with
respect to racial discrimination, the concept of a necessarily representative jury system holds in both state and federal courts. Moreover, the fifth circuit in Labat v. Bennett48 said that "[t]he Court's
language [in Thiel] seems to extend the holding beyond the mere
application of supervisory power.' 49 There have been several state
decisions which have followed the "cross section rule," 50 despite the
absence of any definitive requirement to do so by the Supreme Court.
B. "State Action"
Inherent in the problem of the intent requirement of the equal
protection clause is the concept of "state action." It has long been
held that no act violates the fourteenth amendment unless it is, to
some degree, the act of state (or local) government. 51 Recent years
have brought about significant expansion of the "state action concept. "52 However, the cases in the field of jury discrimination demonstrate that only intentional "state action" may be considered violative of the equal protection clause.
A far different reading of the "state action concept" was provided by Justice Frankfurter in Terry v. Adams, 53 a case dealing with
46. See also Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946), in which the Court
applied the cross section standard to sex classifications in jury selection in the federal
courts.
47. In Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947), the Court bypassed the opportunity to apply the standard to the states despite the vigorous dissent of Justice
Murphy. See Note, supra note 38, at 1111-17.
48. 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966).
49. Id. at n.40; see United States v. DiTommaso, 405 F.2d 385, 389 n.5 (4th Cir.
1968).
50. E.g., Allen v. State, 110 Ga. App. 56, 137 S.E.2d 711 (1964); State v.
Madison, 240 Md. 265, 213 A.2d 880 (1965); People v. Henry, 55 Misc. 2d 134, 284
N.Y.S.2d 726 (1967); see Economic Discrimination in Jury Selection, 1970 LAW AND
SOC. ORAER 474, 479.
51. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-19 (1883).
52. See, e.g., Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
53. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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the "state action" requirement of the fifteenth amendment. Although
he deals with a different provision of the constitution, Justice Frankfurter's definition is useful for purposes of fourteenth amendment
analysis.
This phrase ["state action"] gives rise to a false direction in that it implies some impressive machinery or deliberate conduct normally associated with what orators call a sovereign state. The vital requirement
is state responsibility-that somewhere, somehow, to some extent,
there be an infusion of conduct by officials, panoplied with State
power, into any scheme by which colored citizens are denied voting
rights . . . 4
If the Frankfurter analysis of "state action" were to be applied to the
jury discrimination cases, it would not be necessary to show that there
has been an intentional effort on the part of officials to exclude members of certain groups from jury service. Rather, the only essential
fact would be whether any underrepresentation was caused by acts
for which state officials were responsible. This interpretation of the
"state action concept" seems especially accurate in light of the manner
in which the framers of the fourteenth amendment chose to phrase
the equal protection clause. Conspicuously absent is any reference to
specific intent. The clause reads: "[N]or shall any State ...deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."' 5
If the framers had not intended governments to be held strictly liable
for their violations, why did they fail to include any reference to the
intent requirement in the fourteenth amendment? It is apparent that
the fact that only purposeful "state action" has been held to violate
the equal protection clause is purely a result of judicial interpretation
and is not supported by the words of the Constitution itself.

III. DE FACTO JURY DISCRIMINATION
AND DE FACTO SCHOOL SEGREGATION

It has been nearly a century since the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Strauderv. West Virginia." The Court, however,
has never confronted the possibility of abandoning the intent require54. Id. at 470 (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion).
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
56. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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ment in jury discrimination cases. The law in the field of education
57
has progressed far more rapidly.
Among the first to argue that de facto (nonintentional) segregation in schools should be found to violate the equal protection clause
was Professor Harold Horowitz, who wrote:
[The] cases express an unsound principle if they say that state
action giving effect to a classification which subjects some persons to
unequal treatment in a meaningful way is not subject to the limitation of the fourteehth amendment solely because specific intent to
disadvantage those individuals cannot be shown. Certainly constitutional limitations on governmental action need not be keyed to distinctions between specific and general intent or intent and negligence,
which serve entirely different purposes in determining a private individual's (or governmental official's) civil or criminal liability. A
constitutional guarantee of equal treatment at the hands of government should not be rendered ineffective because state administrative
officials who make classifications are not malicious but only bumbling ....[L]ack of discriminatory purpose should not insulate a state
agency's action from the fourteenth amendment if an unreasonable
classification is applied to similarly situated persons. 8
It is interesting to note that although the essence of Professor Horowitz's article concerns school segregation, the above quotation criticizes
the intent requirement of the fourteenth amendment in all situations.
Indeed, the argument for finding de facto school segregation to be
unconstitutional coincides with the gravamen of the argument against
the maintenance of the intent requirement in jury discrimination
cases. Each stresses that it is the effect of the state action which is
noteworthy and not the "symbolic offensiveness"5 9 that derives from
discriminatory purpose.6 0
57. The initial finding that a state statute which purposely segregates school
children according to race violates the equal protection clause, in Brown v. Board ot
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was announced seventy-four years after Strauder v.

West Virginia, its counterpart in the jury discrimination field. Yet, the body of law
which has been formulated in the field of education has been used to tackle the
problem of the intent requirement of the fourteenth amendment while the law in the
jury discriminaton area has not. This demonstrates the fact that our courts have attached more importance to educational opportunity. It is additionally evident that the
law of jury discrimination has not moved rapidly enough to keep pace with emerging

ideas in fourteenth amendment law.
58. Horowitz, Unseparate But Unequal, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1147, 1152 (1966)
(footnotes omitted).
59. Goodman, De Facto School Segregation, 60
60. See id. at 435-36.

CALiF.

L. REv. 275, 435 (1972).
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A. Keyes v. School District Number One"'
The issue of whether de facto school segregation is in violation
of the fourteenth amendment was squarely faced by the Supreme
Court in Keyes v. School District Number One where a majority of
the Court held that the distinction between de jure (intentional) and
62
de facto segregation should be retained in education cases." Justices
Douglas and Powell, while agreeing with the majority's disposition
of the case, 63 opposed the retention of the distinction between segregation with intent and de facto segregation.
The opinion of Justice Douglas states that there is no difference
between de jure segregation and what has become known as de facto
segregation. According to Justice Douglas, the latter, as it is practiced,
is not really unintentional but results from a "subtle" brand of purposeful discrimination where "neighborhoods" are created along racial
lines and racially unbalanced schools result.64 Evidently, he is not
recommending that the intent requirement of the fourteenth amendment be altered, but is merely expressing his view that de facto school
segregation, in practice, is not unintentional. 5 He cites Judge Wisdom
in the case of United States v. Texas Educational Agency,00 who said
that this "subtle" brand of discrimination is merely "another form of
67
de jure segregation."
It is Justice Powell in Keyes who tackles the validity of the intent
requirement of the fourteenth amendment in education law. He
argues that while prior decisions spoke in negative terms, outlawing
6
intentional segregation, the case of Green v. County School Board"
expanded this doctrine to impose an "affirmative duty" on state governments to eliminate school segregation "root and branch."6' 9 According to Justice Powell, the Green holding is totally incompatible with
61. 413 U.S. 189 (19731.
62. Id. at 208-09.
63. The case was remanded to the district court for a final decision consistent with
the standards announced by the Supreme Court.
64. 413 U.S. at 214-16 (Douglas, J., separate opinion).
65. For a view of the Douglas opinion which implies that he is advocating the
abandonment of the intent requirement, see Note, Segregative Intent and the Single
Governmental Entity in School Segregation, 1973 DuxE L.J. 1111.

66. 467 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1972).
67. 413 U.S. at 214-16 (Douglas, J., separate opinion), citing United States v.
Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848, 863-66 (5th Cir. 1972).
68. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
69. Id. at 437, 438.
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an interpretation of the equal protection clause which strikes down
only intentional segregation. 70 This argument can easily be analogized
to the problem of reconciling the Smith and Glasser holdings with tlde
intent requirement. Indeed, liberal readings of these jury discrimination cases may impose an affirmative duty on jury commissioners to
71
maintain representative jury systems.
Justice Powell also discusses the 1972 case of Wright v. City of
Emporia72 where the Supreme Court held that a legislature's motives78
were not to be considered in determining whether there had been an
unconstitutional failure to integrate the schools of a Virginia city. He
refers to the fact that the Court, in Wright, decided that it was the
harmful result of discrimination which was to be avoided notwith
standing the best intentions of the lawmakers. Acknowledging that in
Wright there, had been a previous finding that the school system
violated the fourteenth amendment, a fact which clearly distinguishes
that case from Keyes, Justice Powell nevertheless states that "[t]he net
result of the Court's language [in Wright] is the application of an
effect test to the southern school districts and an intent test to those
in other sections . . . . 74 It is evident that, to Justice Powell, the
effect test is far more equitable because the effect of segregation is the
evil to be eliminated. This reasoning is equally germane in the field
of jury discrimination. Interestingly, Justice Powell supports his viewpoint by quoting the jury discrimination case of Hernandez v. Texas.7 5
But the Hernandez case is merely one more example of an instance
where the Court spoke in terms of an objective effect standard but
failed to institute a test which is devoid of the intent requirement.76
The Powell opinion also indicates that adherence to the highly
subjective intent standard leads to vast evidentiary problems. It is
hardly a facile endeavor to determine a person's true purpose in
70. 413 U.S. at 222 (Powell, J., concurring).
71. See Kuhn, supra note 12, 257-60.
72. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
73. There are those who would differentiate between intent and motivation. See
Heyman, The Chief justice, Racial Segregation and the Friendly Critics, 49 CALuF. L.
Rav. 104, 115-16 (1961), in which the author defines "motive" as being a more immediate drive. The Supreme Court has never adoped the distinction. For a fascinating
discussion of the problem, see Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
74. 413 U.S. at 232 (Powell, J., concurring).
75. 347 U.S. 475 (1954). "The result bespeaks discrimination, whether or not
it was a conscious decision on the part of any jury commissioner." Id at 482.
76. The Hernandez case does not forego the intent requirement. Id. at 480.
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advocating a specific course of action.7 The best that can be expected
from any body of law which is solely dependent on examinations of
motivation is, in the words of Justice Powell, an "uneven and unpredictable result. 1 7 Surely, as Justice Powell indicates, the use of an
objective standard which focuses entirely upon whether a system effectively represents the population would be far more manageable, 0
whether in the area of education or jury discrimination. Although
our law seeks to examine motives in many situations, to say that we
are able to do so accurately would be highly speculative in the least.
Because the development of case law in the field of education
does not parallel precisely that of jury discrimination, it is difficult to
analogize all aspects of Justice Powell's reasoning to the issue at hand. 0
However, the thrust of the Powell argument is the proper one. The
intent requirement of the equal protection clause places undue emphasis on chastising the wrongdoer. We must attend instead to the
aggrieved party and concentrate on safeguarding his rights. This
should be our primary goal in both the educational field and in our
system of criminal justice.
Of course, we cannot lose sight of the fact that Justice Powell's
opinion is a minority view. If the Supreme Court has chosen to maintain the intent requirement in education cases, why should its stand
be different in jury discrimination cases?
B. The Fundamentality of Rights: The Right to Equal Educational
Opportunity Versus the Right to a Jury of One's Peers
Initially, it is useful to compare the relative importance, legally,
of the two rights at stake. In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,81 it was held that education is not a fundamental
right for purposes of equal protection analysis. The Court, with Justice
Powell writing for the majority, formulated the general rule that
77. Justice Powell cites the cases of Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224
(1971), McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1973), and United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968) to support the fact that intent ("motivation")
is a difficult factor to ascertain. 413 U.S. at 233-34 (Powell, J., concurring).
78. 413 U.S. at 235 (Powell, J., concurring).
79. Id.
80. For further analysis of the Powell opinion, see Note, supra note 65; Comment, Keyes v. School District No. 1, 9 HAv. Civ. RIOHTS-CIv. Liu. L. RaV. 124
(1974).
81. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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whether a right is fundamental "lies in assessing whether [it is] explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."8 2
In the case of jury discrimination, the right involved-the right
to a jury of one's peers-would appear to be more appropriate for
"fundamental" status under the Court's test than the right to equal
educational opportunity. Though a jury of one's peers is not explicitly
discussed in the Constitution, the language of Strauder v. West Virginia3 connotes that it is an implicit constitutional guarantee.
The right to a trial by jury is guaranteed to every citizen... and the
constitution of juries is a very essential part of the protection such a
mode of trial is intended to secure. The very idea of a jury is a body
...composed of the [defendant's] peers or equals .... 84
This language, taken in conjunction with the sixth amendment's
guarantee of a "right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State ....

"85

is evidence of an implicit constitutional right

to a jury of one's peers. The Rodriguez formula indicates that the right
announced in Strauder deserves to be considered "fundamental."
The "fundamentality" of rights ordinarily is at issue in regard
to the choosing of the proper standard of review in cases being analyzed under the "new equal protection" doctrine. However, it is also
relevant to the discussion at hand to the extent that it distinguishes
the right to a jury of one's peers from other rights, such as that of
educational opportunity, which have been given lesser positions on
the scale of constitutionally protected freedoms. With respect to
this latter category of rights, adherence to the intent requirement may
be subject to criticism, but with respect to rights which are "fundamental," the maintenance of this subjective standard is an even more
serious matter. It is difficult to understand how the Court could, on
one hand, pronounce this class of liberties to be "fundamental"-basic
to our constitution and our system of law-and, on the other hand,
maintain that an infringement of these rights is only violative of the
equal protection clause if the defendant can show that it was intentional. This standard completely overlooks the plight of the defendant
82. Id. at 33.

83. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
84. Id. at 308 (emphasis added).
85. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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who, intentionally or otherwise, has been divested of a vital constitutional safeguard. 8
C. Remedies and Retroactivity
Another distinction which could justify the abolition of the intent requirement in jury cases, notwithstanding the majority opinion
in Keyes, concerns the matter of remedy. In his landmark article on
jury discrimination,8 7 Professor Kuhn expounded the viewpoint that
a decision banning de facto school segregation would be far more difficult to institute than a similar finding with respect to jury discrimination. He commented:
In the case of de facto school segregation, the remedies are difficult
in the extreme. They touch every parent, child, voter and taxpayer.
They require vast sums of money, rare political courage, unprecedented educational innovation, and a drastic change in residential
patterns. In contrast, de facto discrimination in jury selection can be
readily remedied at only slight cost by improved selection and an increase in jury service fees-which after all represent only a transfer
of cash from those who pay taxes to those who serve the taxpayer in
the courts as jurors.88

This analysis, however, does not consider the possibility that the
abolition of the intent requirement in jury discrimination, if adopted,
would be given retroactive effect. Conceivably, retroactive application
of this rule could result in the retrial of a great many cases which had
previously terminated with the conviction of the defendant. Needless
to say, this would cause a great deal of administrative inconvenience
for our courts.
1. The Linkletter Test. The case of Linkletter v. Walker held
that all new constitutional interpretations need not be applied retro86. A related issue is whether the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is offended when one is deprived of a representative jury. The sixth amendment

right to trial by jury was applied to the states in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968). The issue arising from the Duncan decision is whether the "subsidiary" rights

of the sixth amendment are also applicable to the states. If so, when a state fails to
provide a jury of a defendant's peers, a procedural due process violation is present.
For the view that these "subsidiary" rights are not incorporated by the fourteenth

amendment, see id. at 171-93 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
87. Kuhn, supra note 12.

88. Id. at 328.
89. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
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actively. In this case, the Supreme Court formulated the test which is
used to determine whether new constitutional rules relating to "procedural rights and methods of conducting trials"90 are to be prospectively or retroactively applied. The test considers three factors. The
first is the purpose of the new principle and whether this purpose
would be served by retroactively instituting the new rule. The second
factor is the degree to which officials have relied on the old standard.
Thirdly, the expected effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the new principle must be examined.9 1 These
three factors are to be weighed to determine whether retroactive effect is to be given to the new interpretation of the constitution.92
If this test were applied to a constitutional rule which would
abolish de facto jury discrimination, all three of the above factors
would be important considerations. The purpose of such a rule is a
vital one-to secure each defendant's right to a fair determination of
his guilt or innocence by a jury of his peers. If this rule were adopted,
its purpose would be no less vital for those whose convictions preceded
the new interpretation than it would be for those whose criminal trials occurred subsequent to the announcement of the principle. The
importance of the principle's purpose, however, would be counterbalanced by the other factors which the test considers. The element
of reliance is a significant one. Jury commissioners, in reliance on the
old standard, have had no reason to attempt to cure inadequate representation in their jury selection systems absent evidence of discriminatory purpose. In addition, the effect of retroactive application of the
new standard, as has previously been demonstrated, would likely be
a significant aggravation of the already difficult problem of administering our overcrowded courts. 93 Because all of these considerations are
90. Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505 (1973). This case limited Linkletter's test to
apply only in situations where rights relating to trials and trial procedures are at stake.

91. 381 U.S. at 636.
92. Id. at 629.

93. Conceivably, the effect of the new interpretation on the administration of
justice could be greatly diminished by the general rule that unless the defendant in
a criminal case raises an issue at the trial level, that issue is waived forever. Dorszynski

v. United States, 94 S. Ct. 3042, 3047 n.7 (1974); United States v. Hord, 459 F.2d

1003 (9th Cir. 1972); Young v. State, 220 Md. 95, 151 A.2d 140 (1959), cert. denied,

363 U.S. 853 (1962); People v. Friola, 11 N.Y.2d 157, 182 N.E.2d 100, 227 N.Y.S.2d
4"23 (1962).

If only those defendants who questioned the constitutionality of a jury

system at trial could benefit from retroactive application of the new rule, the detrimental effect on our courts would be mitigated.
Many jurisdiction have exceptions to the waiver rule. E.g.,

FED.

R. CaRm. P. 52(B)
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important ones, one wonders how any court could reach a satisfactory
conclusion by attempting to balance them.
2. Williams v. United States.94 The Linkletter test was clarified
to a great extent in 1971 when the Supreme Court decided Williams
v. United States. Justice White, in the majority opinion, stated that
"[w]here the major purpose of a new constitutional doctrine is to
overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its
truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts," 95 the principle should be retroactively applied regardless of any other interests which might be present. 0 He
also said that when a new principle "raises no questions" about this
truth-finding function, retroactive application of the rule will normally be denied. 97 Under this criterion, if the Court declares de facto
jury discrimination to be unconstitutional, the rule should not be held
to apply retroactively. What is at stake here has little bearing on the
process by which the facts are found in a given case-"the truth-finding process." Rather, the demographic composition of juries is important because it bears on the manner in which jury members interpret
the facts in light of the instructions that the judge has given to them.
The stage of trial with which the proposed doctrine is concerned is
the stage subsequent to the finding of facts-the stage in which each
juror, in light of the facts which have been proven, decides whether,
under the applicable law, the defendant should be convicted or acquitted. It is with respect to this latter stage that each juror's experience, outlook and judgment becomes essential, and therefore, the right
to a jury of one's peers becomes an important one.
If the Supreme Court were to follow this line of analysis, it is
which states: "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court." Therefore, the possibility remains that retroactive application of the new interpretation would have a
damagaing effect on the administration of justice.

94. 401 U.S. 646 (1971).
95. Id. at 653.
96. Id.
97. Id.

at 655 n.7. For discussions of the Linkletter and Williams tests, see

Ostrager, Retroactivity and Prospectivity of Supreme Court Constitutional Interpretations, 19 N.Y.L.F. 289 (1973); 6 SUFFOLrK L. Rv. 165 (1971).
At the time of this printing, the Supreme Court decided not to institute retroactively

a finding that jury panels in Louisiana were unconstitutionally composed due to underrepresentation of women. New York Times, Jan. 28, 1975, at 15, col. 1-2. This bolsters
the position that a rule abolishing the intent requirement in jury selection cases should

not be applied retroactively.
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certain that the abolition of the intent requirement would not be
retroactively applied. Therefore, as Professor Kuhn illustrated, the controversy and costs which surround the educational remedies would
be absent in the jury situation. In this regard, legislators and judges
who fear, for practical reasons, the prohibition of de facto discrimination in the field of education, should gain incentive to consider a new
standard which would abolish de facto discrimination in jury selection.
IV. A

PROPORTIONAL JURY SYSTEM?

Would the abolition of the intent requirement necessarily mandate that all jury pools exactly mirror the community? This question
arises in light of the fact that the Supreme Court has stated, on many
occasions, that there is no constitutional guarantee of a jury or a
jury pool which corresponds in direct proportion to the demographic
composition of the population.98 The answer is that the abandonment
of the intent test would not necessarily be inconsistent with the Court's
ruling. Needless to say, it would be highly impractical to expect any
government to arrange a jury system which would consistently produce
juries, jury panels or jury pools which perfectly represent every segment of society. It is not the purpose of the standard proposed here
to impose such a stringent requirement on those who control our jury
selection systems. Rather, the adoption of the new standard would require that when a jury pool significantly underrepresents a cognizable
group,9 9 this fact alone should invalidate the pool. Similarly, when
98.

Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208 (1965); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398,

403 (1945).
99. An issue brought to light by the instant case is whether "young people"
composed a cognizable group to be considered for equal protection analysis. A long
line of cases has held that age groups are not distinct classes. United States v. Allen,
445 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Kuhn, 445 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1971);
United States v. DiTomrnaso, 405 F.2d 385 (4th Cir. 1968); King v. United States,
340 F.2d 123 (1st Cir. 1965). Contra, United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 570
(1st Cir. 1970), in which the court reluctantly acknowledged youth as a cognizable
though "ill defined class."
Apparently, the problem with considering youth as a class for equal protection
purposes is that this category necessitates the drawing of arbitrary age limits to represent class boundaries. Courts are unwilling to allow such arbitrary lines to be drawn.
In the instant case, the defendants suggested that people between the ages of 21 and
29 were inadequately represented in the jury pool of Erie County. They attributed this
chiefly to the fact that in a permanent pool system there are lapses of time during
which no new names are drawn for the pool. As members of the existing pool grow
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individual jury panels within a given system consistently underrepresent a recognizable' group, a per se violation of the Constitution should
be declared. The most conclusive proof that a jury commissioner was
well-meaiing in his attempts to secure a representative system is ir
relevani if defendants are not being tried by juries selected from 'a
true cross section of society. The new rule would impose an affirmative
dutty on all jury officials to see to it that at every stage of the selection
process, all segments of society are reasonably represented.

V. THE

FUNCTION OF LEGISLATUiES

The courts, have a major responsibility in seeing that our jury
systems are representative of our population. But they are by no means
alone in this task. Judicial standards of review may progress, but it
remains the function of legislatures to formulate systems of jury selection which will result in proper representation of individual groups
in jury pools hnd on individual jury panels. In 1968, Congress passed
the Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act'0 0 which most definitely
points our federal jury system in the proper direction.
Several sections of the statute are directly relevant to the matter
at hand. Initially, the statute definitively outlaws de jure discrimination
"on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic
0 Although
status" in the selection of grand or petit juries. 11
Congress
has unfortunately limited the above section to cases of intentional exclusion, later portions of the statute impose an affirmative duty on
jury commissioners to select potential jurors from a fair cross section
of society. Section 1863 (2) calls for "random" selection of jurors from
voter registration lists with the additional requirement that if these
lists are not representative, 102 "some other source" of names is to be
older, there is a void in the younger age categories until the pool is replenished with
new members. The court considered the argument, but did so reluctantly because of

its difficulty with the notion of youth as a cognizable class. Instant case at 494-95, 369
N.Y.S.2d at 702-03.
100. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69 (1970).
101 Id. § 1862. A glaring omission here is the "age" category. See note 99
supra.

102. Although 'approved of as adequate source lists for jury selection in casd

such las United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970), voter registration lists
have been criticized as not being representative of the population. One author studied,

the Rhode Island state and federal jury selection systems and found significant under-
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utilized in addition to the primary source. 103 This section applies the
'principle of Glasser v. United States'0 4 to the procedure of selecting
members of the public to compose a pool of potential jurors in the
federal system. However, once the jury pool has been selected according to the statutory criteria, there are no further safeguards to assure
that these standards have actually resulted in the selection of a representative jury pool. Therefore, the federal statute does not assure that
individual jury panels will be ,selected from a "fair cross section of
the community" as Glasserseems to require.
It is hopeful that the federal statute will be effective in its goal
of achieving juries which more closely mirror the populfation than did
past systems. 105 The adoption of. the Uniform Act by *the states would
certainly have a salutory effect notwithstanding the fact that further
safeguards are necessary.10 6 We must remember, however, that the Erie
County jury selection system prior to January 1, 1974 was also termed
to be a "random" system. The adequacy of the federal system, or of any
system, may only be ascertained by an examination of its 'resultant
jury pools and jury panels.

CONCLUSION

The need for a standard of judicial review which considers the
effect of jury systems rather than the motivations behind them is apparent. The intent requirement of the equal protection clause of the
representation of women, certain educational groups, and young people. He attributes
this largely to the use of voter lists as source lists. His argument is that voters are
not a random group but rather comprise a category of people with a set of characteristics which differ from those of nonvoters. Beiser, supra note 35, at 199.
In the instant case, the court relied heavily on the fact that the studies of the
Erie County jury system compared the system to the population and not to the voter
registration lists from which the pool was selected. The court spoke often of the
fact that Butera approved the use of voter lists. Therefore, the court reasoned, the
only meaningful comparison would be a comparison of the jury pool to the voter
lists. This rationale fails to consider the possibility that in this case, unlike the situation in Butera, the voter registration lists were not representative of a "fair cross

section."
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1863 (b) (2) (1970).
104. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
105. Apparently, in the case of representation of women on federal juries, this
has been achieved to a large extent. See Zeisel, supra note 35.
106. Some states have already done so. E.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§
1254-55 (Supp. 1970); MrCH. CoMp. LAws ANN. §§ 600.1301-.1354 (Supp. 1970).
For further analysis of the statute and its implications, see McKusick & Boxer, Uniform
Jury Selection and Service Act, 8 HAmv. J. LEGIs. 280 (1971).
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fourteenth amendment repudiates the acts of governmental officials
who have resorted to purposeful discrimination, but fails to provide
a remedy for the defendant who is faced with a trial at the hands of a
jury derived from a pool which is almost devoid of his "peers" in cases
where intent to discriminate cannot be proven.
Justice Marshall has said that
[w]hen any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room
qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience, the
range, of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not necessary to assume that the excluded group will consistently vote as a class
in order to conclude, as we do, that its exclusion deprives the jury
of a perspective on human events that may
have unsuspected impor107
tance in any case that may be presented.
This being the case, what notion of due process or equal protection
of the laws could disregard the apparent harm of an unrepresentative
jury system by hiding behind the subjective concept of intent to discriminate? Though de facto jury discrimination may be considered less
heinous than its intentional counterpart, it is certainly damaging
enough to be eliminated.
A glimmer of insight was displayed in Judge Rives' opinion in
Rabinowitz v. United States'08 when he said that "[i]f a fair cross section is consistently lacking [in juries within a given system], then,
without more, it is established that the commissioners have failed in
their duty."'1 9 Taken to its logical conclusion, this language would
abolish the intent requirement." 0 But phrases such as these have appeared before. It is time that definitive action is taken. Trial by jury
is the most fundamental safeguard of our criminal justice system, but
it is a worthless one if we fail to administer it properly. This
can only be avoided by aligning our interpretations of constitutional
principles with the spirit in which they were intended by those who
created them-the spirit of fundamental fairness and equal justice for
all.
KENNETH
107. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972).
108. 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966).

109. Id. at 58.
110. Kuhn, supra note 12, at 265.

B. FORREST

